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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal concerns a multimillion-dollar contract 
dispute over the distribution of profits from medical patents.  
In particular, it involves U.S. Patent No. 5,922,021 (“the ‘021 
patent”), awarded to appellant G. David Jang for coronary 
stent technology.  Jang, a doctor and inventor, sued Boston 
Scientific Corporation (“BSC”), the company to which Jang 
assigned his coronary stent patents, for breach of the patent 
assignment agreement (“Agreement”).  The Agreement 
requires BSC to share profits from the patents with Jang, 
including any damages it recovers from third-party infringers.  
In 2010, BSC settled a claim against the Cordis Corporation 
(“Cordis”) for infringement of the ‘021 patent in combination 
with a claim that Cordis had against BSC.  The net result was 
that BSC made a payment to Cordis, and the parties 
exchanged several patent licenses.  BSC then denied that it 
had recovered any damages that it was obligated to share with 
Jang, and Jang sued. 
 
 The central question in the case is whether the 
Agreement provision that requires BSC to share “any 
recovery of damages” from third-party infringers – § 7.3(c) – 
extends to the benefits that BSC received in the Cordis 
settlement.  According to Jang’s allegations, BSC’s 
infringement claim won it a significant return:  a multibillion-
dollar “offset” in its damages payment to Cordis, as well as 
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valuable patent licenses.  BSC contends that neither of these 
qualify as “damages” under the plain meaning of § 7.3(c).  
Jang argues that they do qualify as “damages,” or in the 
alternative, that BSC violated the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing by structuring a settlement to thwart the 
purpose of § 7.3(c).  In addition, Jang argues that BSC 
violated the Agreement’s anti-assignment provision, § 9.4, by 
licensing his patents to Cordis. 
 
 The District Court granted judgment on the pleadings 
for BSC, and denied his post-judgment motion for 
reconsideration and leave to amend his complaint to add the § 




A. The Assignment Agreement 
 
 In 2002, Jang assigned a series of his coronary stent 
patents to BSC through its wholly owned subsidiary, Boston 
Scientific Scimed, Inc. (“Scimed”).  BSC and Scimed 
develop, manufacture and market medical devices.  The 
assignment agreement granted BSC the exclusive rights to 
develop and sell stents using Jang’s patents, and to prosecute 
patent-infringement suits against third parties.  In return, BSC 
paid Jang approximately $50 million up front.  It also agreed 
to pay him ten percent of future profits from his patents – in 
the Agreement’s terminology, ten percent of “Net Sales” of 
“Contingent Payment Products” – with the payments capped 
at $60 million.
1
  Finally, BSC agreed that if its profits from 
                                              
1
 The Agreement provided that BSC would pay Jang $10 
million towards this $60 million cap if it had not taken certain 
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the Jang patents reached $2.5 billion within five years, it 
would pay Jang an additional $50 million.  
 
The Agreement defined “Net Sales” to include revenue 
from BSC’s own sales as well as any damages obtained from 
third-party infringers.  Section 7.3(c), the key provision in 
this case, directed that “any recovery of damages” from an 
infringement “suit or settlement” should first be used to pay 
BSC’s legal expenses; “the balance” is deemed part of BSC’s 
Net Sales, such that BSC must pay Jang ten percent, and also 
count the recovery toward the $2.5 billion threshold.  App. at 
112.  Section 7.3(c) does not extend to “special or punitive 
damages.”  Id.2  
                                                                                                     
steps toward the marketing of Contingent Payment Products 
by 2004.  BSC made this payment to Jang. 
 
2
 The full text of the provision is as follows: 
 
Any recovery of damages by Scimed in a suit 
brought pursuant to the provisions of this 
Section 7.3 shall be applied first in satisfaction 
of any unreimbursed expenses and legal fees of 
Scimed relating to the suit or settlement thereof.  
The balance, if any, remaining after Scimed has 
been compensated for expenses shall be 
retained by Scimed; provided, that any recovery 
of ordinary damages based upon such 
infringement shall be deemed to be “Net Sales” 
and upon receipt of such recovery amount, 
Scimed shall pay Jang as additional Earn Out 
from such recovery amount an amount 
calculated in accordance with Section 3.1(c) to 
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 The Agreement also included an anti-assignment 
provision, § 9.4, which prohibited either party from 
“assign[ing] its rights or obligations” under the Agreement 
“without the prior written consent of the other party,” and 
required any assignee to agree in writing “to assume all of the 




B. The Cordis Litigation and Settlement 
 
                                                                                                     
reimburse Jang for payments due in respect of 
lost sales of Contingent Payment Products.  
Any such recovery shall be count[ed] toward 
Net Sales as of the date of the infringement for 
purposes of Section 3.1(d).  The allocation 
described in this Section 7.3(c) shall not apply 
as to special or punitive damages.  
 
App. at 112. 
 
3
 Section 9.4 provides in pertinent part that  
 
neither party may assign its rights or obligations 
hereunder without the prior written consent of 
the other party, which consent shall not be 
unreasonably withheld in the case of any 
assignment; provided that the proposed assignee 
under this Section 9.4 agrees in writing to 
assume all of the obligations of the assignor 
party under this Agreement. 
 
App. at 116.  
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 In 2003, Cordis, another manufacturer of coronary 
stents, sued BSC in the District of Delaware for infringement 
of two Cordis-owned patents.  BSC filed a counterclaim 
against Cordis for infringement of Jang’s ‘021 patent.  The 
claims were severed; in 2005, separate juries returned verdicts 
finding that Cordis had infringed the Jang patent, and that 
BSC had infringed the Cordis patents.  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed both 
verdicts.   
 
 BSC was therefore entitled to damages from Cordis for 
infringement of the Jang patent, and Cordis was entitled to 
damages from BSC for infringement of Cordis’ patents.  
Jang’s complaint alleges that each company owed the other 
several billion dollars.  A damages trial was scheduled for 
February 2010. 
 
 On the eve of the damages trial, BSC and Cordis 
settled.  The settlement agreement provided for only one cash 
payment: approximately $1.725 billion from BSC to Cordis.  
Jang alleges, and BSC appears to admit, that this represented 
the net difference between the companies’ claims:  Cordis’ 
damages minus BSC’s damages.  As BSC wrote in its brief, 
the damages to which it was entitled for the Jang-patent 
infringement translated into a “settlement offset” against the 
damages it owed Cordis.  Appellees’ Br. at 19.  Jang alleges 
that BSC’s payment to Cordis was offset by several billion 
dollars.   
 
 The settlement also entailed an exchange of licenses.  
BSC granted Cordis non-exclusive, perpetual, irrevocable, 
fully paid-up and retroactive licenses on eleven Jang patents, 
including the ‘021 patent.  Cordis granted BSC non-
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exclusive, perpetual, irrevocable, fully paid-up and retroactive 
licenses on ten Cordis patents.  Each company released its 
infringement claims against the other.   
 
C. Jang’s Contract Suit against BSC 
 
 Following the settlement, BSC denied that it had 
recovered any damages that it was obligated under the 
Agreement to share with Jang.  Jang filed suit.  He brought 
the case in the Central District of California on diversity 
grounds; it was transferred to the District of Delaware to 
follow the litigation between BSC and Cordis.   
 
 Jang’s complaint presented five state-law claims:  (1) 
that BSC breached the Agreement by refusing to pay Jang his 
share of the infringement recovery; (2) that BSC breached the 
Agreement by refusing to pay Jang his share of the value 
from the licensing of his patents; (3) breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) breach of 
fiduciary duty; and (5) a demand for the enforcement of an 
equitable lien that Jang had claimed on BSC’s right to recover 
from Cordis.   
 
 Each party moved for judgment on the pleadings 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).  Jang, in 
subsequent briefing, alleged that BSC had also breached the 
Agreement’s anti-assignment provision, § 9.4, by licensing 
his patents without his permission.  He noted that he “would 
be prepared to amend” the complaint to add this claim.  App. 
at 559.  He did not, however, amend the complaint.   
 
The District Court granted judgment for BSC.  Of 
relevance here, it held that the value BSC obtained in the 
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Cordis settlement did not constitute a “recovery of damages” 
under § 7.3(c) of the Agreement, and that there could be no 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
absent a breach of the contract’s express terms.  The Court 
declined to address Jang’s § 9.4 claim on the ground that Jang 
had not pled it, and dismissed Jang’s complaint with 
prejudice.  Jang timely moved for reconsideration and for 
leave to amend the complaint.  The District Court denied the 
motion.   
 
 Jang now appeals.  He argues (1) that the District 
Court erred in dismissing his first breach-of-contract claim; 
(2) that it erred in dismissing his alternative claim for breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) that 
it erred in refusing to consider his § 9.4 claim and dismissing 
the complaint with prejudice; and (4) that it erred in denying 






II. Jurisdiction and Applicable Law 
 
 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
 The Agreement includes a choice-of-law provision 
specifying that Massachusetts law shall govern its 
interpretation.  If there is no controlling decision from a 
state’s highest court, we must “predict” how that court would 
                                              
4
 Jang appeals the denial of the motion for reconsideration 
only to the extent it related to the motion for leave to amend.  
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decide, giving “due regard, but not conclusive effect” to 
decisions from lower courts.  Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 




A. Breach of Contract  
 
Jang claims that BSC breached § 7.3(c) of the 
Agreement by refusing to pay him a share of the damages it 
recovered for Cordis’ infringement of the Jang patent.  The 
District Court found that BSC had not breached the 
Agreement because it had not recovered any “damages.”  We 
exercise plenary review of the District Court’s grant of 
judgment on the pleadings.  See Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 
675 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c).  We 
may affirm “only if, viewing all the facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, no material issue of fact 
remains and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Id.   
 
Under Massachusetts law, the interpretation of a 
contract is, in the first instance, a matter of law, but the 
meaning of an ambiguous provision is a question of fact.  See 
Seaco Ins. Co. v. Barbosa, 761 N.E.2d 946, 951 (Mass. 
2002).  “Contract language is ambiguous ‘only if it is 
susceptible of more than one meaning and reasonably 
intelligent persons would differ as to which meaning is the 
proper one.’”  S. Union Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 941 
N.E.2d 633, 640 (Mass. 2011) (quoting Citation Ins. Co. v. 




The District Court found that § 7.3(c) unambiguously 
referred to “cash received or monetary profits.”  Jang v. Bos. 
Scientific Scimed, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d 409, 414 (D. Del. 
2011).  It reasoned that the provision’s terms – “damages,” 
“the balance,” “upon receipt,” and “from such recovery 
amount” – plainly allude to monetary gain.  See id. at 414-15.  
We do not disagree.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 445 (9th 
ed. 2009) (defining “damages” as “[m]oney claimed by, or 
ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or 
injury”).   
 
Jang argues for a broader reading of “damages,” but in 
vain; the cases he cites simply address what kinds of loss 
damages can compensate.  See Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 893 N.E.2d 1187, 1216-17 (Mass. 2008) (noting that 
“damages” means “‘the equivalent in money for the actual 
loss sustained by the wrong of another’”) (quoting F.A. 
Bartlett Tree Expert Co. v. Hartney, 32 N.E.2d 237, 240 
(Mass. 1941)); Hazen Paper Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 
555 N.E.2d 576, 583-84 (Mass. 1990) (finding that 
“damages” in an insurance policy covered costs of 
environmental cleanup); Berube v. Selectment of Edgartown, 
147 N.E.2d 180, 185 (Mass. 1958) (“‘Damages' is the word 
which expresses in dollars and cents the injury sustained by a 
plaintiff. . . .”).  These cases simply confirm that the ordinary 
meaning of “damages” is a sum of money.5 
 
                                              
5
 At oral argument, BSC appeared to take the position that the 
term “damages” is limited to a monetary sum awarded by a 
court or jury.  That reading is foreclosed by the text of § 




The conclusion that § 7.3(c) refers only to monetary 
recoveries does not end the analysis, however, because Jang 
argues that the infringement claim did produce a monetary 
gain for BSC: the cash offset.  Furthermore, he contends that 
§ 7.3(c) uses monetary terms only because the parties did not 
consider the possibility of a non-monetary settlement.  He 
argues that the provision is therefore ambiguous with respect 
to BSC’s recovery of licenses, and must be construed to 
require BSC to share the value of the licenses with him.   
 
1. The Offset 
 
Jang argues that an offset is a monetary gain for BSC, 
and thus a “recovery of damages.”  We agree.  A cash offset 
is the functional equivalent of a cash payment.  Instead of 
receiving a direct transfer from Cordis, BSC deducted the 
amount it would have received from the amount it owed 
Cordis for separate acts of infringement.   
 
An illustration may be useful:  Had BSC received a $2 
billion check for the Jang-patent infringement, and then paid 
Cordis $3.725 billion out of its general funds for Cordis’ 
separate claim, there would be no dispute that the Jang claim 
had produced $2 billion in “damages.”  BSC simply 
combined the transactions.  Using the numbers from our 
illustration, BSC deducted $2 billion from its debt to Cordis, 
thereby receiving the $2 billion in the form of an “offset.”  It 
is still better off, by $2 billion, than it would have been 
without the Jang infringement claim.  This is clearly a 
monetary gain.   
 
Courts have long recognized the equivalence of a debt 
offset and a cash payment through the common-law “right of 
13 
 
setoff”:  “The right of setoff (also called ‘offset’) allows 
entities that owe each other money to apply their mutual debts 
against each other, thereby avoiding ‘the absurdity of making 
A pay B when B owes A.’”  Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 
516 U.S. 16, 18 (1995) (quoting Studley v. Boylston Nat’l 
Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913)); see also Chi. & N.W. Ry. 
Co. v. Lindell, 281 U.S. 14, 17 (1930) (noting that 
discharging a debt by setoff is not “to be distinguished from 
payment in money”).  In this case, BSC made money on the 
Jang patent.  It lost money on Cordis’ separate claim.  That its 
gain and loss were consolidated to produce one net payment 
does not change the fact that the Jang patent produced a 
monetary gain for BSC.    
 
The real question is whether that gain qualifies as a 
“recovery.”  We see no reason why it should not; it makes no 
difference to BSC’s bottom line whether it receives a check 
for the Jang infringement claim or reduces its debt by the 
same amount.
6
  The fact that BSC obtained a right to 
damages, and then regained the value of its lost profits 
through settlement, should be sufficient to demonstrate a 
“recovery.”  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 389 (9th ed. 
2009) (defining “recovery” as, inter alia, “[t]he regaining or 
restoration of something lost or taken away” or “[t]he 
obtainment of a right to something (esp. damages) by a 
judgment or decree”).   
 
What is arguably ambiguous, however, is whether § 
7.3(c) applies only when there is a net “recovery” in the “suit 
                                              
6
 The dissent begs the question of whether an offset qualifies 
as a recovery by unilaterally defining “recovery amount” to 
mean “net monetary payment.”    
14 
 
or settlement” as a whole, or whether it applies to any 
recovery on the particular claims involving Jang patents, even 
if the suit as a whole produces a loss.  The parties do not 
identify this point of uncertainty, but it may underlie their 
disagreement.  If the provision is ambiguous in this respect, 
there is a material issue of disputed fact.   
 
In sum:  Viewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to Jang, as we must at this stage, see Knepper, 675 F.3d at 
257, it is clear that the Jang infringement claim entitled BSC 
to damages, and resulted in a monetary gain – through the 
cash offset – of billions of dollars.  It is arguably ambiguous 
whether this gain qualifies as a “recovery” pursuant to § 
7.3(c).  Because “any recovery of damages” in § 7.3(c) could 
reasonably be read to include the cash offset, the District 
Court erred in dismissing Jang’s breach-of-contract claim as a 
matter of law.  We will therefore vacate the judgment on the 
pleadings so that the case may proceed to discovery.  Cf. Gen. 
Convention of New Jerusalem in the U.S. of Am., Inc. v. 
MacKenzie, 874 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Mass. 2007) (noting 
“that extrinsic evidence may be admitted when a contract is 
ambiguous . . . to remove or to explain the existing 
uncertainty or ambiguity”).  The parties will then be able to 
present arguments as to whether § 7.3(c) applies to the cash 
offset with the benefit of a fuller record, either in motions for 
summary judgment or at trial. 
 
2. The Licenses 
 
Jang also argues that he was entitled to share in the 
value of the licenses that BSC recovered in the Cordis 
settlement.  He contends that the parties did not contemplate 
the possibility of a non-monetary settlement, and that § 7.3(c) 
15 
 
is therefore ambiguous with respect to the licenses.  
Construing all the facts in his favor, it is possible that Jang 
and BSC failed to consider a settlement-in-kind when 
negotiating the Agreement.  This does not, however, render § 
7.3(c) ambiguous with respect to the licenses.   
 
Jang relies on Cofman v. Acton Corp., 958 F.2d 494 
(1st Cir. 1992), in which the First Circuit, applying 
Massachusetts law, found an apparently clear contract 
provision to be ambiguous in context.  In that case, Acton, the 
defendant corporation, had agreed to pay the plaintiff 
companies a sum of money if its stock rose above a certain 
price.  Id. at 495.  Later, its stock plummeting, Acton 
executed a “reverse stock-split” in which it drastically 
reduced the number of its shares on the market.  Id. at 496.  
This had the effect of artificially increasing each share’s par 
value by a multiple of five, far above the contractual 
threshold.  Id.  The plaintiffs demanded their money.  Id.  
Acton refused on the ground that the provision was not meant 
to be triggered unless its fortunes improved, which they had 
not; the parties had simply not considered the possibility of 
stock-price manipulation.  Id. 
 
The First Circuit sided with Acton.  Id.  It found that 
the parties had not provided for stock-price manipulation, and 
that the payment provision could not be read to apply  to 
manipulated price changes, because that would have allowed 
Acton to avoid reaching the threshold by manipulating par 
values downward.  Id. at 497.  The court therefore held that 
the provision was not triggered by Acton’s reverse stock-split.  




Jang argues that the application of § 7.3(c) to a 
recovery of licenses is analogous.  The Agreement does not 
explicitly speak to this situation.  Construing the facts in the 
light most favorable to Jang, it is possible that the parties did 
not consider it.  Jang contends that the contract is thus 
ambiguous, and that we cannot infer that § 7.3(c) was 
intended to exclude non-monetary recoveries, because that 
would allow BSC to evade its obligation at any time simply 
by arranging to receive its recovery in non-monetary form.  
 
Jang’s argument is compelling – but not, in the end, 
persuasive.  First, Jang’s situation is unlike Acton in that, 
whereas the Acton court was willing to read an implied 
exception into a contract, Jang asks us to read an additional 
obligation into the contract.  The Acton court construed the 
parties’ obligations more narrowly than a literal reading 
would suggest; Jang asks us to construe the parties’ 
obligations more broadly.  More importantly, though, Acton 
stands in tension with the great weight of Massachusetts 
contract law.  The central mantra of that law is that contract 
terms must be interpreted according to their plain meaning.  
See, e.g., S. Union Co., 941 N.E.2d at 640.  Only if their 
meaning is indeterminate may the court look to a provision’s 
broader purpose for clarification.  Id.   
 
Section 7.3(c) plainly applies to monetary recoveries 
only.  Even if this is because the parties considered no other 
kind, that omission does not render the scope of § 7.3(c) – 
which imposes an affirmative obligation on BSC – 
ambiguous.  The contract simply does not require BSC to 
share the proceeds of a settlement-in-kind, and we cannot 
supplement the contract terms.  Cf. Winchester Gables, Inc. v. 
Host Marriott Corp., 875 N.E.2d 527, 535 (Mass. App. Ct. 
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2007) (holding that, although the literal application of the 
contract to an unforeseen situation produced an extreme 
result, the court is not “free to substitute” a more rational 
term).   
 
It is true that this reading allows BSC to circumvent § 
7.3(c) by electing to receive any recovery in non-monetary 
form.  If BSC takes this course of action to intentionally 
thwart the purpose of the provision, however, the appropriate 
charge against it is violation of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, not breach of the express contract 
terms.  We agree with the District Court that BSC did not 
breach the Agreement’s express terms in refusing to share the 
value of the Cordis licenses. 
 
B. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing 
 
In the alternative to his breach of contract claim, Jang 
argues that the purpose of   § 7.3(c) was to require BSC to 
share any kind of infringement recovery, and that BSC 
violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
by structuring a settlement deal to thwart that purpose. 
 
Under Massachusetts law, every contract includes an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (“implied 
covenant” or “covenant”).  See Anthony’s Pier Four, Inc. v. 
HBC Assocs., 583 N.E.2d 806, 820 (Mass. 1991).  The 
covenant provides “‘that neither party shall do anything that 
will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the 
other party to receive the fruits of the contract.’”  Id. (quoting 
Drucker v. Roland Wm. Jutras Assocs., 348 N.E.2d 763, 765 
(Mass. 1976)).  Good faith requires “faithfulness to an agreed 
18 
 
common purpose and consistency with the justified 
expectations of the other party.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981); see also Krapf v. Krapf, 786 
N.E.2d 318, 325 (Mass. 2003) (quoting § 205).  Conduct that 
does not breach the express terms of the contract may still 
violate the covenant if it constitutes an “evasion of the spirit 
of the bargain,” id. § 205 cmt. d, or if it violates “community 
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness,” id. § 205 
cmt. a.  “The covenant may not, however, be invoked to 
create rights and duties not otherwise provided for in the 
existing contractual relationship. . . .”  Uno Rests., Inc. v. Bos. 
Kenmore Realty Corp., 805 N.E.2d 957, 964 (Mass. 2004).  
 
The District Court dismissed Jang’s claim on the 
ground that “[t]here can be no breach of [the] covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing . . . in the absence of a breach of 
contract.”  Jang, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 416.  This is incorrect.  
“A party may breach the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing implicit in every contract without breaching any 
express term of that contract.”  Speakman v. Allmerica Fin. 
Life Ins. & Annuity, 367 F. Supp. 2d 122, 132 (D. Mass. 
2005) (applying Massachusetts law); see also Krapf, 786 
N.E.2d at 325.   
 
The appropriate question is whether Jang’s allegations 
state a plausible claim that BSC intentionally subverted the 
purpose of the Agreement and Jang’s justified expectations.  
The complaint alleged that Jang “reasonably expected” to 
share in “the value of the consideration received” by BSC in 
any suit or settlement against infringers, and further that BSC 
structured the settlement to “depriv[e]” him of that benefit, 
“while enriching themselves at Dr. Jang’s expense.”  App. at 
49.  The complaint described the settlement and asserted that 
19 
 
BSC received a value of several billion dollars for the Jang 
patent infringement, while paying Jang nothing.  These 
allegations are minimally sufficient to state a claim for 
violation of the implied covenant, and to survive dismissal on 
the pleadings.
7
   
 
Viewed in the light most favorable to him, Jang’s 
allegations describe a situation similar to cases in which the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has found that a party 
violated the covenant by circumventing – rather than 
breaching – a contractual obligation.  See Krapf, 786 N.E.2d 
at 324-26 (where a divorce settlement entitled the defendant’s 
ex-wife to half of his military retirement benefits, he violated 
the covenant by electing disability benefits instead); Nile v. 
Nile, 734 N.E.2d 1153, 1160 (Mass. 2000) (where a divorce 
agreement required the defendant to leave two-thirds of his 
probate estate to his heirs, he violated the covenant by 
emptying his estate and transferring all his property to his 
new wife); Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 
1251, 1251-58 (Mass. 1977) (jury was permitted to find that a 
company breached the covenant by terminating the plaintiff’s 
at-will contract in order to avoid paying him a commission).  
                                              
7
 We do not, as the dissent alleges, hold that Jang could have 
“understood or expected[] that BSC was obligated to structure 
all settlements to provide for a monetary recovery.”  No one 
disputes BSC’s right to control infringement suits.  What Jang 
claims to have expected is simply that BSC would share the 
value of any recovery for infringement of his patents, 
whatever form it took.  His allegation is that BSC 
intentionally arranged a non-monetary recovery in order to 
exploit the terminology of § 7.3(c) and deny any obligation to 
share the value with him.  
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If BSC intentionally circumvented its obligation to share 
infringement profits with Jang by arranging to receive those 
profits in a form that does not qualify as a “recovery,” it may 
have violated the covenant. 
 
The cases that BSC cites are not to the contrary.  
Where the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has found 
an implied-covenant claim to be precluded as a matter of law, 
the plaintiff’s expectations were “flatly inconsistent with the 
plain language” of the contract.  Merriam v. Demoulas Super 
Markets, Inc., 985 N.E.2d 388, 396 (Mass. 2013) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Eigerman v. Putnam 
Invs., Inc., 877 N.E.2d 1258, 1265 (Mass. 2007) (company 
could not violate the covenant by refusing to repurchase 
employee stock shares when the stock-share plan explicitly 
gave it that right); Lafayette Place Assocs. v. Bos. Redevel. 
Auth., 694 N.E.2d 820, 831 (Mass. 1998) (city agency could 
not violate the covenant by refusing to modify express 
deadlines in the contract).   
 
In this case, nothing in the Agreement explicitly grants 
BSC the right to keep any non-monetary recovery without 
obligation to Jang.  Nothing flatly contradicts Jang’s asserted 
expectations.  Nor is the alleged “spirit of the bargain” 
patently unreasonable, as in Uno Rests., 805 N.E.2d at 962-65 
(lessee could not reasonably expect its landlord to reject 
lucrative third-party offers for its leased space simply because 
it could not match their price).  BSC may ultimately convince 
a fact-finder that Jang’s expectation of sharing in any 
infringement recovery was not justified.  At this stage, 
however, the reasonableness of his expectation is a disputed 




Because there are disputed material facts as to the 
purpose of § 7.3(c) and the reasonableness of Jang’s 
expectations, his implied-covenant claim is not barred as a 
matter of law, and the District Court erred by dismissing it on 
the pleadings.     
 
C. Jang’s § 9.4 Claim 
 
Finally, we briefly address Jang’s arguments that the 
District Court erred in dismissing the complaint without 
considering his § 9.4 claim, and in denying his post-judgment 
motion for reconsideration and leave to amend.  We review 
both decisions for abuse of discretion.  See United States ex 
rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 302 
(3d Cir. 2011); Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 
220 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 
1. Dismissal of the Complaint with Prejudice  
 
The District Court declined to address Jang’s § 9.4 
claim on the basis that Jang had not pled it.  This was correct.  
Jang asserts that he adequately pled the § 9.4 claim –  that 
BSC breached § 9.4 by unilaterally granting Cordis perpetual 
licenses to Jang patents – because he pled “the elements of a 
claim for breach of contract.”  Appellant’s Br. at 41.  But to 
state a claim that can survive dismissal, a complaint must 
include “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”  
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).   
 
Jang’s bare recital of the elements of a breach-of-
contract claim was clearly insufficient to state a claim for 
breach of § 9.4.  The supposed “clarification” in his brief in 
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opposition to judgment on the pleadings, which in fact 
presented an entirely new legal theory, did not cure the 
defective complaint.  See Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 
188, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2007).  Jang’s proffer that he “would be 
prepared to amend” his complaint, App. at 559, does not 
change the analysis, because it cannot be construed as a 
motion for leave to amend.  See Ranke v. Sanofi-Synthelabo 
Inc., 436 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2006).  The District Court 
thus did not abuse its discretion in declining to address the § 
9.4 claim, nor in dismissing the complaint with prejudice.  
See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 
Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that in non-
civil rights cases, district courts have no obligation to offer 
leave to amend before dismissing a complaint unless the 
plaintiff properly requests it).   
 
2. Denial of Jang’s Motion for Reconsideration 
and Leave to Amend  
 
Federal plaintiffs are entitled to amend their complaint 
once, as of right, within twenty-one days of serving it or of 
receiving a responsive pleading or motion to dismiss.  FED. R. 
CIV. P. 15(a)(1).  After the twenty-one days, “a party may 
amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written 
consent or the court’s leave.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).  A 
district court “should freely give leave when justice so 
requires,” id., but may deny leave on a finding of undue 
delay, bad faith, prejudice to the opposing party, or futility.  
See Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 
273 (3d Cir. 2001).  When a party seeks leave to amend a 
complaint after judgment has been entered, it must also move 
to set aside the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(e) or 60(b), because the complaint cannot be 
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amended while the judgment stands.  See Fletcher-Harlee 
Corp., 482 F.3d at 252; 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1489 (3d ed. 2013).  
We have held that “[w]here a timely motion to amend 
judgment is filed under Rule 59(e), the Rule 15 and 59 
inquiries turn on the same factors.”  Cureton, 252 F.3d at 272; 
see also Burtch, 662 F.3d at 230. 
 
In this case, the District Court denied Jang’s Rule 15 
and 59(e) motions on the ground that his delay in seeking 
leave to amend was undue and prejudicial to BSC.
8
   Delay 
may become undue “when a movant has had previous 
opportunities to amend a complaint” but instead “delays 
making a motion to amend until after [judgment] has been 
granted to the adverse party,” and when “allowing an 
amendment would result in additional discovery, cost, and 
preparation to defend against new facts or new theories.”  
Cureton, 252 F.3d at 273.  The District Court found that 
Jang’s delay met these criteria.  Jang could have moved to 
amend his complaint at any time before the District Court 
granted the dismissal.  He offered no cogent reason for his 
failure to do so.  Even on appeal, his only explanation is that 
“it was early in the case, the pleadings had not previously 
been tested, and so Dr. Jang clarified [the § 9.4 claim] in his 
briefs, indicated his willingness to amend the Complaint if 
                                              
8
 Jang argues that the District Court improperly constrained 
its analysis to the typical Rule 59 analysis rather than 
consider the Rule 15 and 59(e) motions together.  The District 
Court did consider the Rule 15 factors, however, and held that 
Jang’s Rule 15 motion lacked merit even “independently of 




necessary, and then waited for the District Court to rule.”  
Appellant’s Br. at 54.   
 
This court has declined to reward a wait-and-see 
approach to pleading.  See Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 
196, 204 (3d Cir. 2006) (“When a party fails to take 
advantage of previous opportunities to amend, without 
adequate explanation, leave to amend is properly denied.”); In 
re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 280 (3d Cir. 
2004) (“Plaintiffs relied at their peril on the possibility of 
adding to their complaint. . . .”).  While the District Court’s 
cursory analysis of the delay and resulting prejudice was not 
optimal, the Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Jang’s post-judgment motion for reconsideration and leave to 
amend.
9
  We note, however, that because we are reversing the 
judgment on the pleadings, Jang remains free to file a new 
motion for leave to amend.  We express no opinion as to the 




Viewing all the facts in the light most favorable to 
Jang, two of his claims are sufficiently colorable to survive 
judgment on the pleadings:  (1) that BSC breached         § 
7.3(c), because the cash offset qualifies as a “recovery of 
damages”; and (2) that BSC violated the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing by structuring a settlement to 
thwart the agreed purpose of § 7.3(c).  The District Court thus 
erred in finding Jang’s claims barred as a matter of law and 
                                              
9
 We need not reach BSC’s additional argument that 
amendment would have been futile. 
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granting judgment on the pleadings for BSC.  We will reverse 
the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.    
1 
 
Jang v. Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc., No. 12-3434  
Barry, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
 The Majority concludes as follows: Dr. Jang’s claim 
that BSC breached § 7.3(c) of the Agreement because the 
cash offset qualifies as a “recovery of damages,” and his 
claim that BSC violated the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing implicit in that Agreement by structuring a settlement 
to thwart the purpose of § 7.3(c), were “sufficiently 
colorable” to survive judgment on the pleadings.  Maj. Op. at 
21.  It, thus, reverses the judgment, and remands for further 
proceedings.  Because I believe § 7.3(c), the concededly key 
provision in this case, to be decidedly unambiguous, I 
respectfully dissent.  
 
 Section 7.3(c) requires BSC to pay Dr. Jang from the 
“balance, if any” from “any recovery of damages” received in 
a covered infringement suit against a third party.  As the 
Majority concedes, the “any recovery of damages” language 
“plainly” refers to monetary recoveries only.  Id. at 14.  What 
it found to be ambiguous, however, was whether the cash 
offset here was a monetary recovery qualifying as a “recovery 
of damages” within the meaning of § 7.3(c).  It 
unambiguously was not.  
 
 Under § 7.3(c), there can only be an additional earn 
out to Dr. Jang from the “balance,” after expenses, of the 
“recovery amount,” i.e. the net monetary payment, that BSC 
received from the “suit or settlement” of a covered 
infringement claim.  BSC did not “recei[ve]” a net monetary 
payment  in settlement of the Cordis litigation so there was no 
“balance” from which to calculate an additional earn out.  
That Dr. Jang may not have contemplated offsetting claims or 
non-monetary settlements, or have considered the possibility 
that broader terms— “benefit,” “consideration,” e.g.—might 
be necessary for a non-monetary recovery to be swept in, 
does not render § 7.3(c) ambiguous or require us to rewrite it 
in his favor.  Under the unambiguous language of § 7.3(c), 
the earn-out provision was not triggered, and judgment was 





 With respect to the claim for violation of the implied 
covenant, there is nothing in this record suggesting that Dr. 
Jang, in fact, understood or expected, or even could have 
understood or expected, that BSC was obligated to structure 
all settlements to provide for a monetary recovery; indeed, the 
Majority found even the allegations of the complaint to be 
only “minimally sufficient.”  Id. at 16.  Moreover, any 
suggestion that Dr. Jang understood or expected that BSC had 
any such obligation would be belied by § 7.3(b), which states 
that  “[BSC] shall have the right, but not the obligation, to 
institute, prosecute and control legal proceedings to prevent 
or restrain [third-party] infringement” (emphasis added), a 
provision that gives BSC broad, unqualified discretion to 
bring suit and make all decisions regarding suit, including the 
resolution of that suit.  It is not for us to add limits to BSC’s 
authority and thereby enable Dr. Jang to achieve collaterally 
what he neglected to achieve contractually.  See Uno Rests., 
Inc. v. Bos. Kenmore Realty Corp., 805 N.E.2d 957, 964 
(Mass. 2004).   
 
  Finally, I note that, although the Majority has 
discerned a “material fact” or two in dispute as to the purpose 
of § 7.3(c) and the reasonableness of Dr. Jang’s expectations, 
it nonetheless cites and does not question what the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has decided: where the 
Court has “found an implied-covenant claim to be precluded 
as a matter of law, the plaintiff’s expectations were ‘flatly 
inconsistent with the plain language’ of the contract.”  Maj. 
Op. at 17 (quoting Merriam v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc., 
985 N.E.2d 388, 396 (Mass. 2013)).  So, too, here—at least in 
my view.   
 
 I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
